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A growing body of literature over the past decade suggests that a ﬁrm’s
organizational structure or capital can contribute in signiﬁcant ways to the
productive capacity of a ﬁrm. But, as with other intangible assets, there is
no consensus deﬁnition of what this organizational capital is, how to mea-
sure it, or how best to quantify its contribution to output (either current or
future). Unlike physical capital, its value does not appear on the balance
sheet of a ﬁrm, and when ﬁrms undertake substantial organizational
change or reengineering this is typically treated as “consumption” rather
than an increase in the assets of a ﬁrm. There is no “market” for organiza-
tional capital that we could use to generate a book value for it, and, unlike
general human capital, it is not portable.
When considering the issue of measuring intangibles, a recent Brook-
ings Task Force chaired by Margaret Blair and Steven Wallman (2001) sug-
gested that there are three categories of intangible assets, each with more
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tive comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.that can be owned and sold, the next category is for those assets that can be
controlled by the ﬁrm but not separated out and sold, and ﬁnally, the cate-
gory with the most diﬃcult measurement issues contains assets that may
not be wholly controlled by the ﬁrm. Intangible assets such as copyrights,
brand, and trade names would be in the ﬁrst category, the relatively easily
addressed category of measurement problems, since they can be bought
and sold. However, the degree of control the ﬁrm has over assets such as the
design of production processes, human capital, relationship capital, and
organizational capital varies along with the ability of the ﬁrm to “sell”
these assets. As a result, they are much more diﬃcult to measure in the
usual accounting sense.
Before we can discuss how to improve the measurement of organiza-
tional capital, we must ﬁrst establish a working, albeit crude, deﬁnition of
organizational capital.1 To do this we have chosen to focus on some of the
elements of organizational capital that have been shown, in both theoreti-
cal and empirical studies, to be associated with higher productivity for
ﬁrms and/or higher wages for workers. This is not meant to be an exhaus-
tive list of all the elements of organizational capital but rather a starting
point that is representative and tractable.
We divide organizational capital into three broad components—work-
force training, employee voice, and work design (including the use of cross-
functional production processes). While we will discuss these categories
separately, it is important to note that there are important links and syner-
gies between each of these categories that contribute to the overall value of
organizational capital within a ﬁrm.
Although training is usually thought of in the context of human capital,
employer-provided training is an important component of workplace or-
ganization and organizational capital. We assume, for the sake of simplic-
ity, that education decisions are primarily individual based and made in-
dependently from the employment relationship. But workplace training 
is a joint decision undertaken by the worker and the ﬁrm to invest in addi-
tional skills training after an employment relationship has begun. This
workforce training, along with the education a worker brings to a job,
raises the productive capacity of a ﬁrm. Training demands of a ﬁrm are not
limited to the introduction of new technology; as new organizational struc-
tures such as teamwork are put in place, this increases the need of workers
to acquire additional training to help them function in a more interactive
group environment. At the same time, organizational capital may interact
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1. For a diﬀerent approach to and deﬁnition of organization capital see Atkeson and Ke-
hoe (2002). They conclude that nearly half of the output in manufacturing that is not ac-
counted for by payments to labor and capital could be attributed to organization capital.
They also conclude that the value of this organization capital is roughly two-thirds the value
of physical capital. They model the acquisition of organization capital as coming from en-
dogenous learning-by-doing so it is embodied in the ﬁrm and jointly produced with measured
output. But their empirical treatment of organization capital is based on plant-speciﬁc pro-
ductivity and age rather than any actual workplace practices.with human capital, and the ability of a ﬁrm to undertake organizational
change may be a function of the human capital of its workforce. Finally,
spillover eﬀects even for “speciﬁc training” may be much larger depending
on the organizational structure of a ﬁrm in which these investments in hu-
man capital are made. For all of these reasons, then, we include workforce
training under our umbrella of organizational capital.
The second component of organizational capital is employee voice. By
this we mean those organizational structures that give workers, especially
nonmanagerial workers, input into the decision making associated with
the design of the production process and greater autonomy and discretion
in the structure of their work. Traditional forms of work organization are
very task speciﬁc; each production worker has a speciﬁc task to complete,
and once they learn how to accomplish the task, there is little independent
thought involved. However, newer forms of organization involve giving
employees, speciﬁcally lower-level production workers, more input into
the production process and greater opportunities to improve eﬃciency. As
employee voice increases, ﬁrms are better able to tap into the knowledge of
nonmanagerial workers.
There is a large continuum of practices associated with employee voice.
These range from the employee suggestion box in the lunch room, to em-
ployees’ being consulted individually about their views, to individual job-
enrichment schemes, to employees’ being consulted in groups, and ﬁnally
to self-managed teams where production employees work in a semiau-
tonomous setting. In addition, all of this can take place in the context of
unionization, which may serve to help or hinder this communication pro-
cess. As discussed by Malcomson (1983), agreements made between man-
agers and workers may not be legally enforceable, so the presence of unions
can address incentive compatibility problems that may arise at the work-
place. In addition, negotiations that management undertakes with workers
about the introduction of new workplace practices are less expensive if the
company has to deal only with union specialists rather than each individ-
ual worker.
Our third component of organizational capital is work design, including
the use of cross-functional production processes that result in more ﬂexible
allocation and reallocation of labor in the ﬁrm. Examples of practices in
this component include reengineering eﬀorts that may involve changing
the occupational structure of the workplace (including increasing the num-
ber of technical workers), the number of workers per supervisor, the num-
ber of levels of management within the ﬁrm, the existence and diﬀusion of
job rotation, and job share arrangements. We also include in this compo-
nent methods by which ﬁrms monitor their practices relative to others,
such as benchmarking. Some of the changes we see in work design are as-
sociated with the introduction and diﬀusion of information technologies
within the ﬁrm. For example, as new technologies reduce the cost of lateral
communication, we see ﬁrms using these technologies to facilitate greater
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managerial. Monitoring technologies can also be used to reduce the num-
ber of supervisors required in the production process. So there are possible
complementarities between this and other dimensions of organizational
capital, as well as with investments in physical capital.
While it is not a type of organizational capital per se, incentive-based
compensation plays an important role in organizational capital. More gen-
erally, if we observe wage premiums being paid in employment situations
where there is a higher level of organizational capital we might, in a very
crude way, think of this premium as another way to “price” the value of the
asset we are calling organizational capital. Employers will use wages and
other forms of compensation to try to hold on to this relational asset. In
addition to the basic wage, employers can also pay workers by piece rate,
stock options, proﬁt sharing, and bonuses related to achieving speciﬁc pro-
duction targets. These are all tools that ﬁrms have used to, in part, realign
workers’ interests toward those of shareholders. But when workers are
asked to come forward with ideas that would improve the production pro-
cess but may also put their own jobs at risk, they must be given an incen-
tive to do this.
Putting a portion of compensation “at risk,” especially for nonmanage-
rial employees, can have an important eﬀect on the amount and type of
relationship capital that exists within a ﬁrm and can have a large eﬀect 
on workers’ discretionary eﬀort. Recent work by Boning, Ichniowski, and
Shaw (2001) has found strong evidence of complementarity between em-
ployee voice and incentive pay. So while incentive-based pay is not organi-
zational capital per se, it is an important glue that holds the organizational
capital together and keeps it within the ﬁrm. Therefore, in the remaining
discussion on measurement issues we will also include this dimension of
workplace practices.
Our three components are not an exhaustive list of possible elements of
organizational capital. For example, Kruse and Blasi (1998) identify em-
ployment security and recruitment and selection systems as important
components of what they label high-performance work practices. But as
with compensation, employment security and recruitment and selection
systems are probably best thought of as “glue” rather than organizational
capital. The next section summarizes some of the empirical work on the
impact organizational capital has had on ﬁrms and workers.
6.2 The Importance of Organizational Capital in the New Economy:
Empirical Evidence
The importance of correctly measuring organizational capital stems
from the evidence on its impact along a number of dimensions—labor pro-
ductivity, wages, and labor demand. In addition, there is evidence of links
208 Sandra E. Black and Lisa M. Lynchbetween organizational capital, human capital, and physical capital, espe-
cially information and communication technologies.
In terms of productivity, there is an extensive literature documenting 
the relationship between organizational capital and ﬁrm performance.2
Examples of intra-industry studies include work by Ichniowski, Shaw, and
Prennushi (1997), Arthur (1994), Kelley (1994, 1996), Bailey (1993), and
Dunlop and Weil (1996). By examining human resource practices associ-
ated with one speciﬁc production process it is possible to greatly reduce
problems of underlying heterogeneity of production processes. Most of the
intra-industry studies conclude that the adoption of a coherent system of
new human resource management practices such as ﬂexible job deﬁnitions,
cross-training, and work teams, along with extensive reliance on incentive
pay, results in substantially higher levels of productivity than more tradi-
tional human resource management practices.
Another research strategy is to examine a more representative cross-
sectional sample of ﬁrms to determine the impact of workplace practices
on broader measures of performance such as productivity or proﬁtability.
Examples of this strategy include Black and Lynch (2001, 2004), Bartel
(1989), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001), Ichniowski (1990), Huselid (1995), Huselid and Becker (1996), and
Delaney and Huselid (1996). All of these studies have found a correlation
between human resource management systems and business performance
as measured by labor productivity, Tobin’s q, or present-value gain in cash
ﬂow and ﬁrm market value. Many of these have also found evidence of the
existence of synergies among workplace practices: the total impact is
greater than the sum of the parts.3
Given that this volume is interested in measurement issues from the per-
spective of the economy as a whole, is it possible to translate some of the
micro-based evidence on the impact of organizational capital on labor pro-
ductivity to the economy more generally? In particular, since a large frac-
tion of the output growth in manufacturing in the 1990s was driven by in-
creases in multifactor productivity, can any of this be potentially attributed
to organizational capital? In Black and Lynch (2004), we use our estimates
of the impact of workplace practices on labor productivity in manufac-
turing (done using establishment-level data) in a growth-accounting frame-
work in order to see, roughly, how much of the overall growth in manu-
facturing during 1993–95 our measures of workplace innovation could
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2. See Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) for a thorough review of this literature.
3. The theoretical work of Milgrom and Roberts (1995) and Kandel and Lazear (1992),
along with the empirical studies mentioned above, are important contributions in this area.
Milgrom and Roberts argue that the impact of a system of human resource practices will be
greater than the sum of its parts because of the synergistic eﬀects of bundling practices to-
gether. Kandel and Lazear argue that introducing a proﬁt-sharing plan for all workers in a
ﬁrm may have little or no impact on productivity unless it is linked with other practices that
address the inherent free-rider problem associated with corporatewide proﬁt-sharing plans.account for. We present these calculations again in table 6.1 along with the
ﬁgures reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) over the same time
period to “benchmark” our ﬁndings with their numbers. As seen in this
table, the sample of manufacturing establishments that we used in our em-
pirical work (the Educational Quality of the Workforce survey [EQW]) ex-
perienced very similar output growth over the period 1993–96 as reported
by the BLS for the country as a whole. The BLS reports that output growth
in manufacturing grew at a compound average annual growth rate of 4.2
percent between 1993 and 1996. We ﬁnd a rate of 4.7 percent using the
EQW data over the same period. The BLS reports that combined inputs
(capital, labor, and materials) grew 2.3 percent over this period, and using
the estimated coeﬃcients from our empirical work (Black and Lynch 2004)
as shares we ﬁnd that inputs grew at 3.2 percent for the EQW sample. As a
result, multifactor productivity grew 1.9 percent in the BLS reported ﬁg-
ures and 1.6 percent using EQW data.
As a rough approximation of the contribution of organizational capital,
we use the coeﬃcients on the workplace practices that come from our micro-
level production function estimation to calculate the impact of workplace
innovation on multifactor productivity. We ﬁnd that they contributed 1.4
percentage points per year. In other words, changes in organizational cap-
ital may have accounted for approximately 30 percent of output growth in
manufacturing over the period 1993–96, or 89 percent of multifactor pro-
ductivity. An important caveat is that many of the components of work-
place organization, such as reengineering, reﬂect both technological as well
as organizational changes. Though the number seems high, we believe that
this accounting exercise indicates that measuring organizational capital
can go some way in explaining recent trends in multifactor productivity.
Given that it improves productivity, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that orga-
nizational capital also has an impact on workers, both in terms of their
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Table 6.1 Compound average annual rates of growth in output and the contribution
of factor inputs and multifactor productivity, manufacturing (% per
year), 1993–96
Bureau of  Black and 
Labor Statistics Lynch (2004)
Output 4.2 4.7
Combined inputs (includes capital, 
labor, and materials) 2.3 3.2
Multifactor productivity 1.9 1.6
Contribution of workplace practices 1.4
Remaining residual 0.2
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Multifactor Productivity Trends, 1998, released Septem-
ber 21, 2000 and authors’ own calculations from the EQW-NES ﬁrst and second round cross
sections with a 1 percent trim as presented in Black and Lynch (2004).wages and in terms of skill demand. Investments in organizational capital
seem likely to beneﬁt the workforce because workers are unlikely to con-
tribute in the manner these practices require unless they are assured a share
of the gains (Osterman 2000). Organizational changes may also require a
higher level of human capital from individual workers since they need to
deal eﬀectively with increased uncertainty and responsibility (see Oster-
man 1994 and Lynch and Black 1998). In terms of the empirical work on
the impact of organizational capital on wages, the evidence is mixed. Us-
ing data from a representative sample of employers, Osterman (2000) ﬁnds
no impact of work organization practices on wages of either core work-
ers or all workers over the period 1996–97, and Cappelli and Carter (2000)
ﬁnd no impact on wages of nonmanufacturing workers. In contrast, both
Black, Lynch, and Krivelyova (2004) and Cappelli and Neumark (2001)
ﬁnd that wages of manufacturing workers increase when employers extend
their usage of organizational practices such as team work. Black, Lynch,
and Krivelyova also ﬁnd that the impact of organizational capital has the
largest eﬀect on the wages of supervisors, production, and sales or clerical
workers in the manufacturing sector.
The March 2001 Industrial and Labor Relations Review is a special issue
devoted to the impact of technology and work organization on wage in-
equality at the industry level. While not all studies in this volume were able
to have access to data on organizational capital, some studies in this vol-
ume, such as Hunter and others (2001), Batt (2001), and Bailey, Berg, and
Sandy (2001) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between workplace organiza-
tional practices and earnings.
While there has been less done on the impact of organizational capital
on labor demand, several recent studies have looked at this question. Theo-
retically, as discussed by Kremer and Maskin (1996) and Acemoglu (2000)
and reviewed in the context of organizational change and wage inequality
by Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Peñolosa (1999), when technological and
organizational change takes place, skill homogeneity can increase within
ﬁrms. Therefore, if technical change and organizational change are com-
plementary activities, as argued in Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt
(2002), and since technical progress tends to be skill biased, it may be the
case that the organizational change would also be skill biased. Osterman
(2000) ﬁnds that measures of organizational capital are associated with a
higher probability of layoﬀs, even within ﬁrms that have been experiencing
net gains in total employment. This is suggestive of the reallocation pro-
cess hypothesized in Kremer and Maskin and Acemoglu. Caroli and Van
Reenen (2001) ﬁnd evidence for British and French ﬁrms that a variety of
measures, consistent with our deﬁnition of organizational capital, are as-
sociated with reduced demand for unskilled workers in both countries.
While the focus of this paper is not on measuring information technol-
ogy, several researchers have found strong positive correlations between
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nology (IT), and additional investment in organizational capital. Bresna-
han, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) ﬁnd evidence of strong complementar-
ity between several indicators of IT use, workplace organization, and the
demand for skilled labor. The positive correlation between computers and
workplace practices is also shown in Lynch and Black (1998) and Caroli
and Van Reenen (2001). Finally, it is important to note that, while we have
divided our measure of organizational capital into three components, there
is an extensive literature, both theoretical and empirical, that suggests the
existence of synergies in practices. For example, Athey and Stern (1998)
discuss how the existence of complementarity in workplace practices im-
plies that the adoption of one practice has externalities for adoption deci-
sions about other practices. In addition, if practices are adopted in clusters,
then some combinations of practices may occur only infrequently, making
it diﬃcult, empirically, to precisely estimate the impact of these practices
on outcomes such as productivity.
6.3 How Has Organizational Capital Been Measured?
Data on organizational capital and related components such as com-
pensation, recruitment and selection methods, and employment security
provisions have been collected at three levels of aggregation. The ﬁrst level
of aggregation is case studies of individual companies. One of the most fa-
mous examples is the 1983 Harvard Business School case study of the Lin-
coln Electric Company by Norman Berg and Norman Fast; another, more
recent example is Ann Bartel’s (2004) study of a Canadian bank. The next
level of aggregation includes detailed intra-industry studies such as the
work by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) on the integrated steel in-
dustry. One of the many beneﬁts of intra-industry data is the ability to ex-
amine organizational practices without the confounding eﬀect of diﬀerent
production processes and organizational structure that are due to the pro-
duction of diﬀerent goods.
But the focus of this paper is to examine how more nationally represen-
tative surveys of businesses have attempted to capture these measures of
organizational capital. This will help identify whether or not there are
some measures of organizational capital that might be relatively easy to
add to nationally representative ongoing surveys of businesses. This could
be especially useful from a national incomes account perspective. For this
purpose we focus on micro employer surveys from the 1990s that measure
the components of organizational capital we believe have been shown to be
the most important in analyses of productivity, wages, and labor demand.
One of the earliest surveys of workplace practices to use these measures
to study their impact on labor productivity and Tobin’s q was Ichniowski
(1990). He used data on personnel policies and practices taken from a 1986
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covering 495 Compustat II business lines. This was a mailed survey of the
Compustat sample with a 10 percent response rate. Tables 6.2–6.4summa-
rize some of the questions used from this survey divided into the three com-
ponents of organizational capital we are looking at—training, employee
voice, and work design. The training measure is a simple incidence of for-
mal training. The employee voice measure is primarily the right of workers
to voice complaints under some form of due process rather than any type
of direct employee participation in decision making within the ﬁrm. Fi-
nally, the measure of work design collapses a variety of diﬀerent work
structures into one variable. In the empirical work done with these mea-
sures, they are not introduced on their own but rather are collapsed into
nine clusters of practices.
Mark Huselid conducted two mailed surveys of U.S. ﬁrms in 1992 and
1994. Surveys were mailed to 3,477 ﬁrms in 1992 and 3,847 ﬁrms in 1994,
and employers were asked about their organizational practices in the pre-
vious year. The sample was drawn from the 12,000 publicly held ﬁrms listed
in Compact Disclosure, a commercially available database containing an-
nual 10-K reports. The overall response rate was 28 percent in 1992 and 20
percent in 1994. In addition, there was a subsample of ﬁrms that responded
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Table 6.2 Survey questions on training
Survey Training questions asked
Ichniowski (1990) Does your business have a formal employee training and
development program?
Huselid (1995), Huselid and  How many hours of training per year are typically received by 
Becker (1996) an experienced employee (someone employed more than one
year)?
Osterman (1994, 2000) Proportion of core employees who received diﬀerent types of 
training (e.g., oﬀ the job or cross training)
Gittleman, Horrigan, and  Variety of training incidence measures including types of 
Joyce (1998) training oﬀered (basic, workplace-related, and job skills) along
with reason for training (technology, skill speciﬁcity, seniority,
retention)
Black and Lynch (1996, 2001, 2004),  Variety of training questions on incidence of formal and 
Lynch and Black (1998) informal training programs; types of training oﬀered,
including computer skills training, team work training, sales
training, and new methods training; proportion of workers
trained by ﬁve occupational categories; the costs of training as
a share of total labor costs; does training occur oﬀ the job.
Caroli and Van Reneen (2001) In the past three years have you trained workers aiming at
specialization or trained workers aiming at multiskilling?
(French data)to both surveys, allowing for longitudinal analysis of organizational struc-
ture and performance outcomes of the ﬁrm. The survey included informa-
tion on a wide range of organizational practices (shown in tables 6.2–6.4).
The responses to these questions were then factor analyzed to see their im-
pact on Tobin’s q and the gross rate of return on assets.
While Ichniowski and Huselid both focused their surveys on large busi-
ness lines or entire ﬁrms, Paul Osterman employed a slightly diﬀerent strat-
egy and focused on individual establishments. He conducted two telephone
surveys (rather than mail) in 1992 and 1997 to compile a nationally repre-
sentative sample of U.S. establishments. By directing the questions to es-
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Table 6.3 Survey questions on employee voice
Survey Employee voice questions asked
Ichniowski (1990)a Do you have any formal information sharing program with these
groups of employees?
Do you conduct attitude surveys among any of these groups of
workers?
Is there a formal grievance procedure or formal complaint resolution
system?
Huselid (1995), Huselid and  What proportion of the workforce are included in a formal 
Becker (1996) information-sharing program (e.g., a newsletter)?
What proportion of the workforce is regularly administered attitude
surveys?
What proportion of the workforce participate in Quality of Work
Life (QWL), Quality Circles (QC), and/or labor management
participation programs?
Osterman (1994, 2000) Proportion of the establishment’s core employees involved in problem
solving groups
Proportion of the establishment’s core employees involved in teams
Proportion of the establishment’s core employees involved in Total
Quality Management (TQM)
Gittleman, Horrigan, and  Are there worker teams in the establishment?
Joyce (1998) Is there TQM?
Are there Quality Circles?
Is there employee involvement in the establishment’s technology and
equipment purchase decisions?
Black and Lynch  Is there TQM?
(1996, 2001, 2004) Proportion of non-managerial workers meeting regularly to discuss
workplace issues
Proportion of workers in self-managed teams
Caroli and Van Reneen (2001) For any of the organizational methods I will mention (including
delayering, Just-in-Time, Quality Circles, and TQM) would you tell
me if it is already implemented, in the process of being so, being
considered, or not even thought of, in your establishment?
aAll questions were asked separately for a business’s union and nonunion production workers.tablishments rather than corporate headquarters, he hoped to obtain more
accurate information about implementation of workplace practices. The
response rates to the surveys were 65 percent for 1992 (806 establishments)
and 58 percent for 1997 (683 establishments). The 1997 survey also con-
tained a subsample of 462 establishments that were also interviewed in
1992, thereby allowing for longitudinal analysis. The questions on work-
place practices were restricted, however, to “core” employees within the
establishment and covered the proportion of these type of workers in 
training, self-managed work teams, job rotation, quality circles or oﬀ-line
problem solving groups, and Total Quality Management (see tables 6.2–
6.4 for more information on the types of questions asked).
The BLS Survey of Employer-Provided Training (SEPT) was conducted
in 1993. While the primary purpose of this survey was to collect detailed in-
formation on employer training provided or ﬁnanced by private nonagri-
cultural establishments, information on other organizational practices was
also collected. Nearly 12,000 establishments were surveyed, with a re-
sponse rate of 71.3 percent (7,895 establishments). In addition to answer-
ing extensive questions on types of training and training practices, 5,987
establishments provided information on the organization of work. The tar-
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Table 6.4 Survey questions on work design
Survey Work design questions asked
Ichniowski (1990) Does your organization use a formal job design program to integrate
work content and the qualiﬁcations required of employees to perform
work? If yes what type of job design do you use? (a) work
simpliﬁcation, (b) job rotation, (c) job enlargement, (d) job enrichment,
or (e) other
Huselid (1995), Huselid  What proportion of the workforce hold jobs that have been included in
and Becker (1996) a formal job analysis?
Osterman (1994, 2000) Proportion of the core employees involved in job rotation
Gittleman, Horrigan, and  Is there job rotation?
Joyce (1998)
Black and Lynch  Variety of measures including benchmarking, reengineering, number 
(1996, 2001, 2004) of managerial levels, percentage of workers in job rotation, job sharing
Caroli and Van Reneen  Have you in the last three years made any substantial changes in work
(2001) organization or working practices not involving new plant machinery
or equipment that directly aﬀected the jobs or working practices of 
the manual workforce—and then asked for nonmanual workers? (for
British est.)
For any of the organizational methods I will mention, would you tell
me whether it is already implemented, in the process of being so, being
considered, or not even thought of in your establishment (included in
this list is delayering, quality circles, and TQM)? (French data)get respondent was ﬁrst the training department, next the human resource
department, and ﬁnally the oﬃce manager. Establishments were asked
which, if any, of the following six work organization practices were in exis-
tence in 1993: worker teams, total quality management, quality circles, peer
review of employee performance, employee involvement in the ﬁrm’s tech-
nology and in equipment purchase decisions, and job rotation. (See Gittle-
man, Horrigan, and Joyce 1998 for more details as well as tables 6.2–6.4.)
The data set we have used for our own work on labor productivity, train-
ing, and wages (e.g., Black and Lynch 1996, 2001, 2004; Black, Lynch, and
Krivelyova 2004; and Lynch and Black 1998) comes from the EQW Na-
tional Employers Survey conducted in 1994 and 1997. The EQW National
Employers Survey (NES) was ﬁrst administered by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census as a telephone survey in August and September 1994 to a nation-
ally representative sample of more than 3,000 private establishments with
more than 20 employees. The survey represents a unique source of infor-
mation on how employers recruit workers, organize work, invest in physi-
cal capital, and utilize education and training investments. The survey
oversampled establishments in the manufacturing sector and establish-
ments with more than 100 employees. Public-sector employees, not-for-
proﬁt institutions, and corporate headquarters were excluded from the
sample. The target respondent in the manufacturing sector was the plant
manager and in the nonmanufacturing sector was the local business site
manager. However, the survey was designed to allow for multiple respon-
dents, so that information could be obtained from establishments that kept
ﬁnancial information such as the book value of capital or the cost of goods
and materials used in production at a separate ﬁnance oﬃce (typically at
corporate headquarters for multi-establishment enterprises). Computer-
assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) was used to administer each sur-
vey, which took approximately twenty-eight minutes to complete.
The sampling frame for the survey was the Bureau of the Census Stan-
dard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL) ﬁle, one of the most compre-
hensive and up-to-date listings of establishments in the United States. By
design, the survey allowed for a subset of establishments to be matched to
the Census Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) that includes longi-
tudinal information for manufacturing establishments only. The LRD,
housed at the Center for Economic Studies at the Bureau of the Census,
was created by longitudinally linking the establishment-level data from 
the Bureau of the Census’s Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM). The
LRD data include information on shipments, materials, inventories, em-
ployment, expenditures on equipment and structures, book values of
equipment and structures, and energy use (for more information on the
LRD see Haltiwanger and Davis 1991). Because we are able to match the
LRD with the EQW NES, we have annual establishment-level data on in-
puts and outputs of production for the manufacturing employers in our
216 Sandra E. Black and Lisa M. Lynchsurvey. It is important to note that the LRD is basically the universe of all
manufacturing establishments with more than 250 employees but is only a
subsample of establishments with less than 250 employees.
The response rate for manufacturing establishments in the 1994 EQW
NES was 66 percent (1,621 establishments) and 60.6 percent (1,324 estab-
lishments) for nonmanufacturing establishments. These response rates are
substantially higher than most other voluntary establishment surveys. Pro-
bit analysis (available from the authors upon request) of the characteristics
of nonrespondents indicates that there was no signiﬁcant pattern at the
two-digit industry level in the likelihood of participating in the survey. The
only businesses more likely not to participate were manufacturing estab-
lishments with more than 1,000 employees.
The telephone survey was repeated again in 1997 and the overall re-
sponse rate was 59 percent (4,139 establishments). There was also a sub-
sample of 766 establishments that had been interviewed in 1994. The re-
sponse rate of establishments in the longitudinal sample was 74 percent. In
both surveys, a wide range of questions were asked about training and
workplace practices. The training questions included not only incidence
measures of whether the establishment undertook any formal training of
its workers but also types of training (e.g., computer literacy, team work
training, literacy training), the proportion of workers trained by ﬁve occu-
pational categories, and the percentage of total labor costs that training ex-
penditures represented. In terms of employee voice, the survey included
questions about the proportion of nonmanagerial workers meeting regu-
larly to discuss workplace issues, total quality management, the propor-
tion of workers in self-managed teams, and union status. For work design,
the surveys included questions about the usage of benchmarking, the per-
centage of workers in job rotation, the number of managerial layers, and
whether the establishment had undergone any reengineering eﬀorts.
The last surveys we examine are those British and French data sets used
by Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) for their work on workplace organization
and skill demand. The British data are from the British Workplace Indus-
trial Relations Survey (WIRS), an establishment-level data set that consists
of a cross section of over 2,000 British establishments in 1984 and 1990. In
1984 there are a number of questions that relate to organization change,
and in 1990 there is a limited follow-up that asks more basic information.
In both surveys, senior managers are asked whether there has been an in-
troduction of new plant, machinery, or equipment that includes new micro-
electronic technology; the introduction of new plant, machinery, or equip-
ment not including new micro-electronic technologies; and whether there
have been substantial changes in work organization or working practices
not involving new plant, machinery, or equipment. A positive response 
to the last question would indicate changes in organizational capital. Car-
oli and Van Reenen attempted to verify that the change in organizational
Measuring Organizational Capital in the New Economy 217capital indicated in the survey actually corresponded to changes in rele-
vant workplace practices by examining the 1984 data, in which managers
were asked in more detail what the change actually involved. In general,
this change in work organization was associated with increases in respon-
sibility and is more likely to be associated with a widening range of more
interesting tasks performed by workers.
The corresponding French data set is the REPONSE (Relations Profes-
sionnelles et Negociations d’Entreprise), which was constructed with ref-
erence to the British WIRS. They surveyed 2,500 establishments, asking
senior managers in 1992 about industrial relations and organization in
1989–92. This survey includes more detailed information on workplace or-
ganization, including explicit questions on delayering (removing one or
more managerial levels), quality circles, and total quality management.
(See Caroli and Van Reenen 2001 for more details on both the British and
the French surveys.)
It is clear that there is no one way that has been used to conduct these
surveys. All of these surveys target diﬀerent respondents, use a range of
sampling frames, target diﬀerent levels of the ﬁrm (from the establishment
to business lines to the ﬁrm as a whole) for measures of organizational
practices, utilize diﬀerent methods to conduct the survey (mail or tele-
phone), and have a range of response rates. The next section of the paper
summarizes some of measurement problems that arise from this range of
strategies to collect information on organizational capital.
6.4 Measurement Issues
There are a number of issues regarding data collection of organizational
capital; however, many of these issues are not unique to organizational
capital. One of the more basic questions is what is the appropriate business
unit to study when considering organizational structure. Does each ﬁrm
have a particular organizational structure, or is it even deeper than that,
and does organizational structure vary within the ﬁrm across establish-
ments? Interestingly, there has been little focus on this question, with a va-
riety of studies using diﬀerent units of observation. Bartel (1989) uses a
data set in which the business line is the unit of observation, Huselid (1995)
and Huselid and Becker (1996) use ﬁrm-level data, while Black and Lynch
(1996, 2001, 2004) use establishment-level data.
Once the appropriate unit of observation is determined, the next ques-
tion becomes who should be surveyed. Responses obtained from workers
within a ﬁrm might be diﬀerent from those obtained from managers, which
in turn may be diﬀerent from responses from human resource workers. In
the training literature, there is evidence that ﬁrms report that signiﬁcantly
more training is given by ﬁrms than is actually received by workers when
workers are queried (see, e.g., Barron, Berger, and Black 1997, 1999). Gen-
218 Sandra E. Black and Lisa M. Lyncherally, the literature to date has focused on employer surveys under the as-
sumption that employers have a better knowledge of the workplace struc-
ture and training that is being implemented. In addition, recent data col-
lection eﬀorts have focused on the human resource oﬃcer or training
manager as the target respondent for questions pertaining to organiza-
tional structure. For smaller ﬁrms, this individual may be suﬃciently
knowledgeable to also answer questions on the ﬁnancial aspect of the ﬁrm.
However, with larger ﬁrms and perhaps more detailed surveys, as was the
case in the EQW NES, there may be multiple target respondents, with the
ﬁnancial oﬃcer answering questions on investment and output and the hu-
man resource oﬃcer answering questions on organizational structure.
Other issues that make organizational capital hard to measure deal with
its intangible nature. The ability to calculate the depreciation rate of in-
tangible goods has long eluded economists. High turnover could cause or-
ganizational capital to depreciate very quickly, whereas strong ﬁrm at-
tachment could slow depreciation.
When considering the best way to measure organizational capital, evi-
dence suggests that incidence of activities is not suﬃcient. It is crucial to
know not only whether practices were implemented but also how these
practices are diﬀused both across employees or occupations and among
employees within occupations. In addition, it is vital to know how long the
practices have been in eﬀect and what the start-up costs were: both direct,
in terms of dollars spent by the ﬁrm, and indirect, in terms of worker time
are found to aﬀect wages, productivity, and skill demand. Finally, it is im-
portant to know how are these practices being used together.
While the previous section of this paper summarized overall response
rates to surveys that asked questions about organizational practices, the
overall response rates do not reveal variations in response rates to speciﬁc
types of questions included in these surveys. Sometimes employers are con-
fused by jargon that is unfamiliar to them or are concerned that answering
a question may reveal proprietary information. Or employers may simply
have a diﬃcult time coming up with an accurate answer in the context of a
short telephone or mailed survey. Therefore, it is important to understand
which types of questions employers have an easier time responding to. In
order to understand the eﬃcacy of recent eﬀorts to characterize workplace
organization, it is useful to “benchmark” our relative success of getting re-
sponses to measures of organizational capital with more traditional ques-
tions of employer practices. Table 6.5 presents response rates for what we
generally consider to be standard production function variables, broken
down by manufacturing and nonmanufacturing and then further broken
down by ﬁrm size, using our 1994 EQW NES survey. As one can see, re-
sponse rates vary signiﬁcantly across variables and ﬁrm size.
Interestingly, it is the larger establishments that have lower response
rates; large nonmanufacturing ﬁrms have the lowest response rates across






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9the board. Though this may seem surprising, it may be the case that larger
employers are more restricted in terms of the information they are able to re-
lease without approval from corporate headquarters. This limitation high-
lights the importance of allowing for multiple respondents in the survey.
In terms of speciﬁc variables, information on materials used generates
the highest nonresponse rate, with only 59 percent of manufacturing ﬁrms
and 45 percent of nonmanufacturing ﬁrms responding. Second is capital,
with a slightly higher (64 percent manufacturing, 54 percent nonmanufac-
turing) response rate. Establishments seem most able or willing to respond
to questions about employment and the breakdown of the labor force, with
response rates in each occupation category of about 87 percent.
These response rates provide a benchmark with which one can consider
response rates for survey questions on organizational capital. Table 6.6
provides evidence on response rates for questions regarding training. The
top panel shows response rates for types of training, measuring incidence
alone. It is clear that these questions are relatively easy for ﬁrms to answer,
and these factors have been shown to be important factors in production
function estimation (Black and Lynch 1996).
The bottom panel of table 6.6 shows that, when one moves beyond the
incidence of training, response rates begin to fall. An important factor to
measure is the cost of doing training; however, response rates in column (1)
suggest that ﬁrms, particularly large ﬁrms, are not willing or able to answer
these questions. In contrast, it is the larger ﬁrms in manufacturing industries
who seem best able to answer the number of workers trained by occupation;
the smallest ﬁrms have very low response rates. Among nonmanufacturing
ﬁrms, the opposite is true, and response rates drop for the largest ﬁrms.
It is clear that, when training is measured along these dimensions, it is
more diﬃcult to get information from the establishments. However, it is
particularly important to do so in order to build up some measure of the
stock of additional human capital being added to the ﬁrm (similar to new
capital investment). And though these intensity measures are more diﬃcult
to obtain than simple incidence measures, response rates to these questions
are still higher than those for standard capital and materials measures.
Table 6.7 focuses on another aspect of organizational capital: employee
voice. Commonly used measures include the existence of a total quality
management (TQM) system, the percentage of production or frontline
workers meeting in groups, and whether or not an establishment is union-
ized. As table 6.7 shows, response rates to all of these questions are relatively
high, averaging a bit more than 90 percent. These variables have repeatedly
been shown to have important impacts on wages as well as productivity.
Establishments also appear to be able to answer questions about the
organization of the workplace. As table 6.8 shows, response rates for
questions on the organization of the workplace are high, both in manufac-
turing and nonmanufacturing, large and small establishments. Again, the




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5high response rates are particularly important given that these variables
have also been shown to have an impact on productivity and wages in em-
pirical work.
On the compensation side, there is a bit more variation in response rates
(see table 6.9). Proﬁt sharing appears to be relatively easy for ﬁrms to an-
swer, with response rates hovering around 90 percent in all occupations
except technicians, which have slightly lower response rates (particularly in
nonmanufacturing and small ﬁrms). However, response rates drop signiﬁ-
cantly when one looks at wages. Again, technicians have the lowest re-
sponse rates among the occupations. Although response rates seem much
lower, it is important to note that they are still signiﬁcantly higher than
those for more commonly collected variables such as capital and materials.
As with the more commonly collected variables from table 6.5, response
rates fall for larger ﬁrms.
Responses to questions, though necessary, are not suﬃcient. If all ﬁrms
respond to a question but there is no variation across ﬁrms, it is diﬃcult to
impossible to identify the impact of that practice on establishment or
worker outcomes. Given that we know which questions ﬁrms are best will-
ing or able to answer, it is next important to examine how much variation
there is in these practices, both across ﬁrms and over time. For example, if
all ﬁrms indicate that they have some informal training in place (inci-
dence), we would not be able to disentangle the eﬀect of informal training
on outcome measures.
Tables 6.10 through 6.13 present weighted means for a variety of work-
place practices across manufacturing and nonmanufacturing ﬁrms by ﬁrm
size. Table 6.10 shows the incidence of diﬀerent types of training and then
the cost of training, the percentage of training done during work hours,
and the percentage of training done in-house. Among types of training,
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Table 6.7 Response rates for employee voice, 1994 EQW-NES survey
Total Quality  Percentage of production 
Management workers meeting in groups Unionized
Manufacturing total 93 90 93
By ﬁrm size
1–49 90 89 90
50–99 95 94 94
100–249 93 92 94
250  93 89 93
Nonmanufacturing total 92 87 92
By ﬁrm size
1–49 92 91 93
50–99 93 92 92
100–249 93 90 92
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4smaller ﬁrms tend to do less training and there is considerable variation
across ﬁrm size (see Lynch and Black 1998 for a review). There is also sub-
stantial variation across types of training, with fewer ﬁrms, on average,
providing computer literacy training and more ﬁrms providing new meth-
ods training. There is also substantial variation across the costs of training.
Consistent with the idea that large ﬁrms provide more training, training is
a higher share of total labor costs for large ﬁrms, and there is substantial
variation both across ﬁrm size and between manufacturing and nonmanu-
facturing ﬁrms. Finally, there is substantial variation in the timing and lo-
cation of training, with small ﬁrms more likely to outsource and provide
training outside of work hours. These variables have also been shown to
have an association with establishment productivity (see Black and Lynch
1996).
Table 6.11 shows that there is even more variation, relatively speaking,
when one looks at employee voice. Among manufacturing establishments,
small establishments show much less employee voice: they are less likely to
have a system of TQM, a lower percentage of production workers meet in
groups, on average, and they are less likely to be unionized. These numbers
gradually increase as establishment size grows. In nonmanufacturing, the
situation is somewhat diﬀerent. While many establishments have imple-
mented a TQM system, the smaller establishments are the ones that are
most likely to have a larger share of nonmanagerial workers meeting in
groups. Although unionization numbers are low across the board in non-
manufacturing, it is not surprising that larger ﬁrms are much more likely
to be unionized.
Among diﬀerent measures of the organization of the workplace in table
6.12, there is far less variation in incidence and diﬀusion by establishment
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Table 6.11 Summary statistics for employee voice measures, 1994 EQW-NES survey
(weighted means)
Total Quality  Percentage of production 
Management workers meeting in groups Unionized
Manufacturing total 42 40 21
By ﬁrm size
1–49 28 38 12
50–99 41 42 20
100–249 52 37 31
250  66 50 35
Nonmanufacturing total 36 56 11
By ﬁrm size
1–49 33 62 8
50–99 36 55 8
100–249 38 44 18













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2size. For manufacturing establishments, there is little variation in the per-
centage of nonmanagerial workers involved in job rotation, with the num-
ber centered around 17 percent. The number of managerial levels does
increase as the establishment gets bigger, both in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing. Larger establishments are more likely to participate in
benchmarking, while smaller establishments are slightly more likely to al-
low job sharing. There is little relationship between establishment size and
the availability of ﬂextime (though nonmanufacturing establishments are
more likely to have it as a whole) or the percentage of nonmanagerial work-
ers in self-managed teams.
Finally, as shown in table 6.13, among measures of compensation, the
story is the same for both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing estab-
lishments. There is little relationship between establishment size and proﬁt
sharing for clerical or sales workers or production or front line workers.
However, larger establishments are more likely to oﬀer proﬁt sharing for
managerial and technical workers.
In addition to diﬀerences across types of establishments, there are also
diﬀerences over time. If one tries to identify the impact of organizational
capital by focusing on changes within establishments over time (in order 
to eliminate unobserved establishment ﬁxed characteristics), it is essential
that there be signiﬁcant variation over time. This suggests that one should
consider not only the questions asked but the frequency with which estab-
lishments are surveyed. Table 6.14 examines the variation over time in a
number of workplace practices when we consider changes between 1994
and 1997 in the matched panel of establishments in the EQW NES. In this
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Table 6.13 Summary statistics for compensation measures, 1994 EQW-NES survey
(weighted means)
Proﬁt sharing for:
Managerial Technical Clerical/Sales Production/Front 
workers workers workers line workers
Manufacturing total 66 49 55 49
By ﬁrm size
1–49 61 44 51 52
50–99 65 53 56 51
100–249 71 48 55 39
250  75 58 52 52
Nonmanufacturing total 72 42 46 46
By ﬁrm size
1–49 72 43 47 48
50–99 69 36 41 39
100–249 73 41 49 53



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8time period, there are a number of similarities across manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing establishments. Most establishments did not change
their unionization status, with only approximately 15 percent becoming
deunionized during this time period and 1 percent unionizing. A signiﬁ-
cant number of establishments increased the percentage of production
workers meeting in groups, while more establishments stopped the process
of benchmarking than began. The percentage of nonmanagerial workers
involved in job rotation increased, an equal percentage of establishments
increased the number of managerial levels as decreased, and there was an
unambiguous increase in the diﬀusion of technology, with more establish-
ments increasing the percentage of managerial and nonmanagerial work-
ers using computers than decreasing.
It is important to note that, when considering changes over time, one is
particularly susceptible to issues of measurement error, particularly when
focusing on changes over a relatively short period of time. Surveying es-
tablishments too frequently exacerbates this problem.
Finally, it is also important to consider the optimal breakdown of worker
categories. While many data sets currently distinguish between production
and nonproduction workers (for example, the longitudinal research data-
base [LRD]), recent surveys have begun to explore the advantages of ﬁner
worker categories. In the EQW NES, workers are divided into supervisors,
managers, technical workers, production workers, and clerical workers.
While the distinctions may be less important for production function esti-
mation, there may be signiﬁcant beneﬁts to the ﬁner level of detail when
considering the impact of organizational capital on wages and labor de-
mand.
6.5 Final Recommendations
This paper has tried to identify three main elements of organizational
capital that have been shown to have a signiﬁcant impact on productivity,
wages, and labor demand. These three elements include training, employee
voice, and work design. While there have been an increasing number of re-
searchers who have attempted to measure these and other dimensions of or-
ganizational capital for the purpose of documenting its impact on the so-
called “new economy,” these eﬀorts have been uncoordinated and sporadic.
Part of the reason there has been no systematic attempt to measure
workplace practices over time has been a lack of consensus on what to
measure, along with concerns over the costs of measurement.
Our experience with training measures suggests that, while measuring
the capital stock is tough, measuring the stock of training is even tougher.
Evidence suggests that it may be too hard for ﬁrms to calculate a stock
measure, and our best shot is to try to get at new investment in training. 
But we are still left with questions such as these: what is the appropriate
Measuring Organizational Capital in the New Economy 231margin—any training, type of training, duration of training? How do we
think about depreciation?
The good news is that other measures of organizational practices, such
as the percentage of workers meeting on a regular basis, unionization, and
various work design elements, are much easier to obtain. Respondents
have a clear idea of what is being asked, these types of questions are not
time consuming, there is currently substantial variation in the data, and,
importantly, they are associated with outcomes we care about.
Our ﬁnal question deals with the frequency of measurement: how often
should you measure these elements of organizational capital? Our work
suggests that this does not need to be done on a monthly basis or even a
quarterly basis. For training and compensation information to be used for
labor productivity analysis, an annual survey is probably suﬃcient. For the
other components of organizational capital such as employee voice and
work design, checking in every other year is likely more than enough, as
these practices do not change with high frequency.
To date, the literature has been clear: workplace organization matters.
While these ﬁndings have been consistent, the measures of organizational
capital, the unit of measurement, and the frequency of measurement have
not been. Hopefully, careful consideration of the issues and problems as-
sociated with the measurement of organizational capital will help unify
data collection eﬀorts in the future, leaving us with more systematic infor-
mation on ﬁrms, including measures not only of physical capital and hu-
man capital but also of organizational capital as well.
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There is no doubt that organizational capital contributes to the value of
some ﬁrms. The human resource practices—such as teams, training, and
work design—that form organizational capital have been shown to raise
productivity and to raise stock market value. Moreover, the case study ev-
idence illuminating the value of human resource practices is persuasive.
Therefore, it is time that we seek to quantify and understand how organi-
zational capital raises productivity or market value for ﬁrms in the future.
In all likelihood, ﬁrms’ investments in physical capital are declining and
their investments in organizational capital are rising. If we don’t measure
these intangible investments, we will not be able to explain or predict eco-
nomic growth.
Therefore, Black and Lynch examine the potential ways in which we
might measure organizational capital. They emphasize several criteria to
be used in developing the measures of organizational practices: ﬁrst, we
want to develop survey questions that have a reasonable response rate, so
the data are fairly complete; second, we want variables that the survey re-
spondents understand and can readily answer; and third, we want variables
that have some variance across ﬁrms so there is real information in the
data. The authors focus on the use of the EQW data to assess each of these
requirements for the extensive variables that were developed for that sur-
vey. In addition, we also want to measure variables, such as teamwork, that
have been shown to have an impact on performance, so the authors review
the human resource (HR) productivity or HR performance literature.
These are all excellent points.
As for extending their analysis in the future, I have several suggestions.
1. One goal in measuring organizational capital is to add organizational
variables to standard surveys, such as census surveys, so that we can really
develop a time series on these investments. In this case, we must isolate a
few key variables that might serve as proxies for a longer list of variables.
Using the Black and Lynch deﬁnition of organizational capital, we would
wish to ﬁnd key measures for the three categories of teamwork, training,
and job design (and I would add forms of incentive pay). Black and Lynch
give us some guidelines for uncovering such variables. In addition to their
suggestions, we should do two further things. First, we would want to ask
if there are HR practices that serve as the key variables in systems of com-
plementary HR practices. For example, some ﬁrms may have “team-
based” systems, with all other HR practices aimed at supporting the teams.
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Research.It is likely that systems of HR practices vary across industries, technol-
ogies, and ﬁrms, but we should examine the data and literature with this
question of identifying HR systems in mind. Second, we want to look at a
correlation matrix of the HR practices, or undertake factor analysis, to iso-
late those key HR measures. We could do this by industry or by ﬁrm size.
2. What are ﬁrms doing diﬀerently when they invest in new organiza-
tional practices—how does their production process change? In addition
to measuring the practices, we might measure the changes that they pro-
duce. For example, in work on the impact of HR practices on performance,
we create a variable called “connective capital” (Ichniowski and Shaw
2004). Connective capital is the amount of communication links within the
work area, where high communications tend to represent greater amounts
of local problem solving by workers (rather than by engineers or man-
agers). Connective capital is correlated with innovative HR practices, such
as teamwork, incentive pay, information sharing, extensive training, and
careful hiring.
3. We should look to the literature to see if some HR practices seem to
raise the level of output when they are adopted, and if other practices con-
tinually raise the growth rate of output. Both matter to our models of eco-
nomic growth, but in diﬀerent ways.
4. Finally, although good measures of organizational practices may pre-
dict economic growth, we also want to know which types of ﬁrms will gain
the most from these practices. Knowledge regarding which ﬁrms invest will
help us make policy statements, both on the likely growth of potential out-
put and also on possible ways of subsidizing these investments (such as
training) if such subsidies are warranted because there are externalities
with organizational investments that ﬁrms can’t internalize. For example,
if organizational investments require a workforce with high levels of gen-
eral skills, then we should examine options for government subsidies for
these skills, like forms of education. We have very little empirical knowl-
edge of the adoption of practices, and yet clearly this knowledge of adop-
tion practices is essential and may be facilitated by these more extensive
data on organizational practices.
Overall, Black and Lynch suggest important ways of measuring organiza-
tional capital, and in the long run, measures of organizational capital
could be very important in both predicting and creating economic growth.
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